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FOREWORD
Arthur H. Travers, Jr.*
The function of a symposium is to bring together, in print, a group of ex-
perts to examine a problem of current significance. The function of a foreword
to such a symposium is to summarize what is said in the articles to follow, thus
enabling the writer of the foreword to add a title to his publications list (a
result not to be lightly dismissed in a profession which often equates talent and
title-count in the same fashion that some military men equate victory and
body-count) and enabling the less-than-avid reader to acquire enough informa-
tion about the symposium to chatter about it at cocktail parties without the
necessity of actually reading it. It gives me great pleasure to do the conven-
tional. But the subject of this symposium is so important and timely that I
would be greatly disappointed if I discouraged the reader from tackling the
articles themselves.
This symposium deals with federal regulation of advertising; necessarily it
focuses upon that agency assigned the major portion of that regulatory task:
the Federal Trade Commission. Of late, the Commission has been under
attack from groups who claim that the Commission's consumer protection
record is rather poor. I do not propose to enter the debate about the FTC's
performance here, beyond venturing the pedestrian comment that undoubtedly
the FTC could do better-as could law professors and every one else. Those
interested in the debate should read the recent, scathing report by "Nader's
Raiders," Chairman Dixon's statement in reply,' and the articles in this sym-
posium, several of which are critical of certain existing practices and policies
and offer constructive suggestions for change.'
Being attacked is nothing new to the Commission. It was severely criticized
in Gerard Henderson's study in 1924;' it was one of many regulatory agencies
scored in Professor Bernstein's important study in 1955;' it received some
demerits in the Civil Service Commission Report in 1965;' and there have been
other negative judgments. But certain aspects of the criticism by Professor
Schulz and his associates indicate that their dissatisfaction with the FTC's
Associate Professor of Law, The University of Kansas. B.A. 1957, Grinnell College; LL.B. 1962,
Harvard.
Senator Nelson had both the report and reply printed in the Congressional Record of January 22,
1969, Extension of Remarks.
2 Whether the move resulted from the recent criticism of the FTC is a matter for speculation, but
President Nixon recently asked the American Bar Association to study the Commission and make recom-
mendations for its "future activities and organization." Wall Street Journal, April 21, 1969, p. 3, col. 1.
'G. HENDRtSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924).
'M. BE sSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 108, 222, 225 and passim (1955).
'CIVIL SERV. COMM'N REPORT 26 (1965).
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performance is related to what has been called "the consumer revolution"'
and to the generalized questioning of the status quo by a variety of groups
within our society. I have in mind the criticism that the FTC has failed to
establish appropriate priorities for the use of its limited resources, particularly
the charges that (1) the FTC has not devoted enough attention to deceptive
practices directed toward low-income and other disadva taged groups; (2) the
FTC has not given sufficient effort to eliminating from the markets goods
creating a health hazard; and (3) the FTC has left the corporate giants pretty
much alone.
It may facilitate the understanding of the significance of these charges if a
few pages are devoted to the status of the consumer and his "revolution." It
cannot now be predicted what direction it will take; it may not be amiss,
however, to note that similar "revolutions" have occurred in the past, and they
led, not to Thermidor, but to the belated understanding that somehow the
ancien regime had not been deposed after all. In other words, from time to
time the feeling becomes widespread once again that, for all the rhetoric, the
consumer is less in control of the market than he had thought.'
In the nature of things the private consumer-as distinct from the in-
dustrial user-of goods is at a disadvantage vis-a-vis a dealer in those goods.
The typical private consumer rarely engages in transactions involving sub-
stantial amounts of money; repeated transactions tend to involve relatively
trivial amounts. Thus, the consumer may purchase a can of peas every week,
but the amount involved in such a purchase ordinarily does not warrant the
expenditure of much effort in learning about peas. The opportunity cost of
such an inquiry would exceed the value of any increased satisfaction that might
result from it. On the other hand, the purchase of an automobile or some
other consumer durable is a transaction of sufficient magnitude for the con-
sumer to lavish more attention on learning about the available options. But
the time lag between purchases often means that information acquired for one
purchase has only slight relevance to the next purchase of the same com-
modity and the complexity of the product often me ns that a great deal of
data must be obtained and assimilated. Thus, while he stakes are higher so
too are the costs of information acquisition. Consumeis are thus often poorly
informed, and their "rationality" and ability to control the market is restricted
accordingly.
By contrast, the canner of peas and the dealer in automobiles are well in-
formed. Because the same basic transaction is repeated many times over, the
information acquired can be used again and again. The opportunity cost of
acquiring the information is low in relation to the amount involved in the
transactions to which the information will be relevant. There is thus a dis-
parity in information between consumer and merchant. This seems to be a
'E.g., J. BISHOP & H. HUBBARD, LET THE SELLER BEWARE: THE CONSUMIER REVOLUTION (1969).
'It is an interesting fact that a large part of the rhetoric about consumer sovereignty comes from the




necessary by-product of the division of labor in a society; the owner of Adam
Smith's pin factory undoubtedly knew a great deal more about the pin market
than did a seamstress who used the pins.
It is perhaps ironic that the consumer's position should be aggravated by
the very success of the American economy in servicing him. It is because the
vast majority of goods and services produced are of acceptable quality that the
opportunity costs of acquiring information are ordinarily not worth incurring.
If one can of peas were delicious but another poisonous, all but those con-
sumers suffering from an excess of nerve or a death wish would deem it
worthwhile to learn which was which.
Moreover, the variety of goods and services offered has also complicated
matters. Faced with an almost infinite range of choices as to goods and serv-
ices, his market decisions are correspondingly more difficult, the number of
items about which he needs more information is correspondingly greater.
Like everyone else limited by his wits, the consumer is forced to engage in
"satisficing" as opposed to the traditional "maximizing" behavior; that is, he
attempts to select a package of goods and services from the wide variety avail-
able that will prove reasonably satisfactory rather than the one best package.8
Whether the consumer is consciously aware of what he is doing is a debated
point, but in any case it would seem that most consumers will find "satisficing"
tolerable only if certain conditions are met. First, the consumer must have
attained an income level that eliminates or significantly alleviates the compul-
sion to maximize. Only if relative affluence is fairly well dispersed throughout
the populace can the bulk of consumers live with their vulnerability. This
may account for the fact that the last great burst of the consumer movement
occurred during the Great Depression when large numbers of consumers-
many of whom were more highly educated than the average member of a low
income group-were reduced to income levels that penalized severely the
failure to get the best buy. It may also account for the fact that the current
interest in consumer affairs has coincided with the development of a national
concern with the persistence of poverty in America despite the general level
of wealth, and with the emergence among disadvantaged groups of a sig-
nificant number of educated and intelligent spokesmen.
Moreover, the facts must warrant the assumption by consumers that no
matter what package they choose, things cannot turn out too badly. This
means, first of all, that none of the goods he might purchase represents a
serious threat to his physical well-being. It means too that, occasional lemons
aside, almost all of the goods he might buy will do pretty much what they are
bought to do for a reasonable length of time. These assumptions allow the
consumer to function in the marketplace without undue anxiety. But in
order to make these assumptions the consumer must have enough information
to exclude from consideration goods and services which are unsafe or shoddy.
'See generally the discussion in J. McGuIRE, THEORIES OF BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 182-84 (1964).
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He need not have as much information as he would require if he were search-
ing for the optimal package, but he needs something.
It is at this point that advertising enters the picture. Although there are
available other sources of information-professional studies like Consumer
Reports and neighborhood scuttlebutt, for instance-mo, t Americans rely upon
advertising for their information about the goods and s;ervices available. The
costs of acquiring information through advertising seem low to the consumer
since the seller is apparently paying to reach him. The Bauer-Greyser study,
conducted in the mid-1960's revealed that the majority of those queried had
attitudes that were more favorable than unfavorable toward the institution of
advertising. Significantly, the major reason given for these approving attitudes
was the informational value of advertising.'"
Critics of advertising are likely'to find such attitude,; laughable: Recline of
an evening before a functioning television set. You will be bombarded with a
fearful amount of advertising; in the end you will know little about the
products being sold, and most of that will be wrong. The chances are you will
not even know one of the facts that economists deem most important: the
price.
All of this may be conceded, but the ads did have infbrmational value none-
theless. They informed the consumer what was available, what it looked like,
and in general what it would do. The very fact that the maker of the product
engaged in extensive advertising on its behalf indicated a substantial company
and one willing to risk its reputation by broadcasting its association with the
product." So long as the consumer continued to make the assumptions given
above, this was about all the information he needed; it told him enough to en-
able him to decide what to include among his range of potential goods. He
was secure.
As a result of the disclosures by Ralph Nader and others, these assumptions
have been shaken: If General Motors can make an unsaife automobile, if Gen-
eral Electric can market a television set that leaks radiation, if other reputable
firms can produce products that are unsafe or of poor quality, then brand name
is no longer an infallible guide to inclusion of the goods for consideration for
purchase. The consumer realizes that there are transactions in which it would
pay him to acquire more information. But he has no li:mus paper test to indi-
cate which transactions these are, and he cannot exhaustively investigate all
of them. The recent demise of the Corvair, following a dramatic shrinkage of
sales in the wake of charges that it was unsafe, may well illustrate the extent
of consumer reaction not only to the threat of harm but to the undermining
of an assumption that enabled him to function in the market.
At the same time consumers are becoming more awae of the unwholesome
amount of advertising that is simply untrue. If FTC actions are any guide,
'R. BAUER & S. GREYSER, ADVERTISING IN AMERICA: THE CONSUMER Viiw 331 (1968).
"o Id. at 333.
" See F. SUTTON, et al., supra note 7, at 148-49.
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whole sections of certain industries seem to be engaged in fraud.12 Recent
studies have shown that a disproportionate number of the victims of these
frauds have been the sick, and the old, and the poor. Not only are these groups
in economic circumstances that require them to get the best buy, but they are
often peculiarly susceptible to fraudulent schemes.1" Spokesmen for such dis-
advantaged groups have objected to the paltry amount of information con-
tained in advertising relative to their need, and the number of misstatements.
With rare exceptions, the larger national corporations have not been en-
gaged in the grosser sorts of frauds. 4 But many of them spend great quantities
of money attempting to convince the consumer that its product-functionally
identical with countless others-is somehow different.' According to the re-
port by Professor Schulz et al., during the first quarter of 1968, $4,618,500
was spent on television advertising for Anacin, $3,110,500 was spent for Bayer
Aspirin, and $2,929,500 was spent for Bufferin.'6 In one way or another these
advertisements suggested the superiority of the particular product being sold,
despite the fact that repeated tests by some of the best laboratories in the
country have been unable to discern any differences among these products,
or between these products and lower priced aspirin." Whether this should be
classified as "fraud" depends upon your point of view, but it is undoubtedly
"well-considered" mendacity, to quote Professor Galbraith. And since the
consumer ends up paying for it in higher prices for these products, it is
expensive."8
Although proprietary analgesics represent the classic case, the use of adver-
tising to create in the consumer's mind imaginary differences among identical
products is a widespread phenomenon. Professor Galbraith has put it with
characteristic pungency:
• . . Most goods perform commonplace functions-they suppress hunger, serve
alcohol or nicotine addiction, move people gradually through heavy traffic, move
waste products more rapidly through the intestinal tract or assist in removing
filth. Little or nothing of importance can truthfully be said about the way a
product performs these routine functions. Flat lies as to their performance are
"Sellers of chinchillas for home breeding and sellers of aluminum siding for the home seem to make
up a disproportionate number of respondents in FTC actions.
"See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963).
" A notable exception was the Holland Furnace Company, which led the FTC on a merry chase
through the litigative process for over thirty years. See W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF
THE MARKETPLACE 22-23 (1968).
' The classic theoretical discussion of this phenomenon is E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPO-
LISTIC COMPETITION 56-116 (7th ed. 1956). See also R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE,
CoNDuCT, PERFORMANCE 18-22 (2d ed. 1967).
'"J. Cox, E. FELLMUTH & J. SCHULZ, THE CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIsSION App. 3
(1969). It may also be worth noting that during the same period $3,552,700 was spent to advertise
Salems, $3,321,600 was spent on Winstons, and $2,103,000 on Kools. So far as I am aware no study
has shown that these brands differ significantly in the amount of tar and nicotine they contain.
1" Id. App. 9.
"The exact cost is hard to calculate. See J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 417-18, 426-27 (1959).
It has recently been estimated that monopoly costs the American economy 45 billion dollars annually in
lost output. See 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 2 (Fall 1968). I have no way of verifying this figure,
and in any case advertising is not the whole story of monopoly. But if the figure is anywhere near
correct, the loss is enormous.
1969]
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generally impermissible. But a surrogate for the truth, in which minor or even
imaginary qualities confer great benefits, is essential.' 9
In the best of all possible worlds, these three basic problems would probably
still exist. Given the limits of human foresight goods will always get on to
the market that create unforeseeable hazards. Given the limits of human
decency, other goods-dangerous or worthless-will always be produced and
people will be found to foist them on the defenseles,,;. Given the limits of
human candor, merchants will always seek to differentiate their products. But
the real question posed by the charges is whether these tendencies are not
intensified by our practice of relying on advertising to mpply consumers with
information.
The cost to the consumer of information acquisition through advertising is
not as low as many consumers may think. Indeed, it may be one of the most
costly ways in which the job can be done. Even the bare information con-
tained in an advertisement is distributed not only to the persons interested in
receiving it, but countless thousands who have no interest in the product what-
ever. But the buyers must pay for all of the informaticn disseminated. More-
over, if consumers are going to rely upon sellers to supply them with informa-
tion, they must expect that the sellers will present it in a manner best cal-
culated to increase their revenues; it is naive to expect 2, disinterested presenta-
tion of the facts and nothing but. Hence, adverti,,ing will continue its
persuasive function as well, even if this means magnifying trivial differences
or inventing imaginary ones. To the extent that advertising costs reflect
efforts at persuasion, they represent little of value to the consumer, who must
pay them as well. And it should not be forgotten thz.t extensive outlays for
advertising in an industry often increase entry barriers and contribute to less
competitive performance.
If the FTC were to operate at peak efficiency, it would probably be unable
to do a great deal to correct a condition that seems inherent in the institution
of advertising as it now exists. This is dramatized by ;ome statistics: In 1967
the FTC received an appropriation of $14,378,000; of this amount, $6,846,000
was allocated to stopping deceptive practices.2" This kitter figure is less than
the combined television advertising budget for Anacin and Bayer during the
first quarter of 1968. With this kind of a stake in its pre,,;ent type of advertising,
it cannot be expected that the makers of analgesics would settle for advertising
copy that would please Ralph Nader. Were the FTC to attempt to enforce
such a standard of candor, it would quickly become mired in a protracted
litigation that might or might not achieve much.
This may be illustrated by the Geritol litigation, of which Professor Schulz
and his group make so much. Geritol is an iron tonic, conceded to be safe
and an effective treatment for certain forms of iron deficiency anemia. In
"1. K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 325 (1967).
23j. Cox, el al., supra note 16 App. 1.
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1962 the FTC issued its complaint against the makers of Geritol;21 its final
order was not entered until 1965,22 and was not affirmed, with minor changes,
by the Sixth Circuit until 1967.23 In 1968 the FTC decided that Geritol's new
commercials were as objectionable as the prior commercials had been;24 it
warned Geritol to stop flouting the order.
Although the Commission's theory altered during the litigation, the ulti-
mate order was predicated on the idea that Geritol's ads implied that if the
viewer were tired, it was probably a result of iron deficiency anemia and, hence,
treatable with Geritol. In fact, most people who feel tired do not have iron
deficiency anemia, and most people with iron deficiency anemia do not feel
tried. The first order required the disclosure of the former fact, but this proved
unsatisfactory. Further disclosures may yet be compelled. But it would seem
that nothing will satisfy the FTC's objections short of the makers of Geritol
making it perfectly clear in every advertisement that there is no way for the
consumer to judge whether Geritol will help him or not. But if the consumer
goes to his doctor, the approved source of the information, the chances seem
remote that he will prescribe Geritol even if he finds iron deficiency anemia.
To the extent that Geritol is successful in inducing potential customers to get
a doctor's opinion, it will cut itself out of the market and pay for the privilege
of doing so. This is a zero-sum game. Geritol's chances of survival seem slim
if the FTC pushes its objection to the limit; the FTC is likely to find anything
less disappointingly ineffective. Given these stakes, Geritol has every incentive
to drag out the litigation for as long a time as possible.
Were the FTC to take on similar crusades against the larger corporations,
similar results could be expected. It would amount to a frontal assault upon
product differentiation by those firms, who have obviously found this a re-
warding policy. While each action was wending its tortuous way to a con-
clusion, other problems would have to be slighted. Pressure to divert resources
to them would build up; in many instances it is not unlikely that any victory
the FTC might wring from the respondent would prove totally pyrrhic. While
additional appropriations would ease the pinch, they are unlikely to be sub-
stantial enough to eliminate the dilemma altogether. Judgments on these
matters can easily differ, but there is room for a good deal of doubt as to
whether this is a sound allocation of resources. Certainly a reasonable man
could conclude that the Geritol litigation represented an enormous amount of
expended resources to very little purpose.
The preceding outline has suggested that the consumer's position stems
ultimately from a pervasive structural condition: He is less well informed
than the seller of goods. He has tended to rely upon the seller to supply him
with whatever information he requires because it has seemed the least costly
'"J. B. Willams Co., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE Ran. REP. 16,213 (FTC Dkt. No. 8547,
Dec. 19, 1962).
mJ. B. Williams Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRAaE REG. RaP. 17,339 (FTC Sept. 28, 1965).
'J. B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
FTC News Release, Dec. 13, 1968.
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way of obtaining it. In fact, it is more expensive than first appears, and the
current consumer unrest reflects an enhanced appreciat:ion of the true cost of
such an information system in higher consumer prices and, in some instances,
personal tragedies. For the foreseeable future, howevr, it may be expected
that consumers will continue to use advertising as their main source of in-
formation. There has been some sporadic discussion of ways in which other
sources of information might be developed, but these plans are hardly more
than fond hopes at the moment. Development of a consumer information
market seems a long way off.
While advertising continues to play its present role in our economy, I am
dubious that the FTC can do much more than perform a cosmetic operation.
This is not to say that it is of no importance how well the FTC performs that
task. Anything that would enable the FTC to improvc its performance would
be helpful, and it is hoped that the articles that follow will contribute to that
end. But it is also important not to conjure up to many visions of the
promised land while much desert remains to be crossed.
